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State aid
“Start-up aid” for low cost carriers – a policy perspective
By Sven B Völcker, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP*
On 7 February 2005, the European Commission published
draft “Community guidelines on the financing of airports and
start-up aid to airlines departing from regional airports” for
consultation. This article focuses on the Draft Guidelines’
statements on “start-up aid,” which seek to integrate the
Commission’s statements in last year’s Charleroi decision into a
consistent state aid policy framework.
It is submitted here that such an attempt is highly problem-
atic, given the absence of a coherent and objective justification
for start-up aid in its proposed form. The Commission should
not depart from its long-standing hostility to operating aid for
reasons of perceived political expediency. At the very least, the
Commission should limit the distortive effects of such aid to
the greatest possible extent, in particular by limiting it to
routes to and from truly regional airports.
Invention of the “start-up aid” concept in the
Charleroi decision and the Draft Guidelines
Partially as a result of the fracas caused by Ryanair, the Com-
mission’s Charleroi decision is mainly known for the Commis-
sion’s demand that Ryanair repay part of the aid that it had
received from the Walloon Region and the Charleroi Airport
Authority.
The Draft Guidelines also seek to create the impression that
they are primarily an attempt to keep in check the “negoti-
ating methods used by low-cost airlines to obtain aid from
public authorities” (para 7).
Less well recognised is the fact that, in the Charleroi decision,
the Commission for the first time accepted that “start-up aid”
for airlines such as Ryanair departing from smaller or
“regional” airports could be compatible with the Treaty at all.
In doing so it not only departed from its 1994 Guidelines on
state aid in the aviation sector (the “1994 Guidelines”), but
also from its consistent policy position that operating aid (aid
subsidising ongoing operations rather than one-off invest-
ments) can only be accepted in the most exceptional circum-
stances.
Indeed, the Charleroi decision and the Draft Guidelines
allow public authorities – usually regions or the publicly-
owned airport authorities themselves – to subsidise for a
period of up to five years as much as 50% of the “start-up”
costs of airlines that open up new routes departing from
regional airports.
This type of aid is clearly operating aid to the benefit of
individual carriers. The 1994 Guidelines allow operating aid
only in two very narrowly defined circumstances:
(i) the aid represents compensation for public service
obligations imposed under Regulation 2408/92, or
(ii) the aid is of a “social character,” i.e. it is granted to indivi-
dual consumers with special needs.
Plainly, neither category applies to services such as those that
were offered by Ryanair and were the subject of the Charleroi
decision. While both the decision and the Draft Guidelines
seek to introduce a number of conditions for start-up aid to be
compatible with the Treaty, the fact remains that the concept
does not fit well with the Commission’s state aid policy to
date.
Justification offered for the “start-up aid” concept
The Draft Guidelines say that start-up aid may “form part of a
coherent airport policy characterised by a demonstrated wil-
lingness to develop the profitability of [regional airport] infra-
structures that are not always profitable.” Start-up aid to airlines
departing from such airports is viewed as helping those airports
to develop the “critical mass” needed to become commercially
viable, and thus ultimately reduce their reliance on public funds.
The Draft Guidelines then offer two principal reasons why
helping the development of regional airports is a worthwhile
undertaking. First, a coherent airport development policy – of
which start-up aid is apparently deemed to be an important
element – will result in the “promotion of regional develop-
ment, tourism, the local economy or a region’s image” (para
77). Second, regional airports “could also provide a solution
to one problem of transport policy: that of saturation of the
capacities of the major airports” (para 79).
Two additional justifications are mentioned in the Charleroi
decision but are absent from the Draft Guidelines: the
environmental benefits of encouraging the use of regional
airports, and their role in the “development of competition”
between airlines.
For the reasons set out below, these considerations do not
justify the authorisation of operating aid in disregard of the
Commission’s consistent state aid policy.
Aid to carriers for the benefit of regional airports?
The very premise of operating aid to carriers – i.e. that they
help regional airport infrastructures become profitable – is
dubious. As the Charleroi example shows, it is typically the
regional airport authority itself that grants the financial
advantages to the relevant airline.
If it were true that up-front financial incentives for carriers
such as Ryanair help to create a “critical mass” of passenger
traffic and therefore move the break-even point forward in
time for regional airports, such up-front promotional benefits
should not be considered “aid” in the first place under the
market-economy investor test.
* Sven B Völcker is a partner in Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, Brussels. This article reflects only
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By definition, such financial incentives would not be state
aid and there would be no need to develop the kind of
extensive rules for finding them compatible with the common
market that the Draft Guidelines seek to lay down.
Quite apart from this basic logical flaw, the “critical mass”
argument provides a very weak link between the obvious and
immediate benefit to the airline and the anticipated long-term
gains to the airport. The Commission’s discussion in the
Charleroi decision of the business plan of the airport authority,
BSCA, illustrates how tempted regional airports can be to
overestimate the long-term financial benefits of a long-term
agreement designed to attract low-cost carriers to the airport.
Indeed, the Charleroi example itself illustrates that toleration
of “start-up aid” may not make “unprofitable infrastructures
profitable,” but may actually have the opposite effect of en-
couraging the build-out of unprofitable infrastructure. As the
Charleroi decision reveals, BSCA actually achieved positive
net results before concluding the agreement with Ryanair.
However, that may change in future: BSCA is currently
building a second terminal at Charleroi, even though the first
terminal’s current utilisation is at most 50%. Thus, instead of
trying to achieve a return on its past investment, BSCA is
increasing its investment in new infrastructure, which can only
be viable if additional airlines are attracted to the airport.
This illustrates the moral hazards of allowing start-up aid to
airlines: if it is successful in terms of attracting additional
traffic, it may prompt further pressure to build additional infra-
structure, which itself is typically financed by public funds.
This in turn may lead to calls for yet more start-up aid to make
use of that additional infrastructure.
Start-up aid as assisting regional development?
The suggestion that start-up aid can conceptually be justified
by regional development is also misplaced. As both the
Charleroi decision and the Draft Guidelines point out, start-up
aid is ad hoc operating aid granted to individual airlines, and
thus cannot be justified by regional development consider-
ations stricto sensu, unless perhaps if the airport in question is in
one of the outermost or sparsely populated regions that are
eligible for special assistance under article 87(3)(a) It is
arguably inconsistent for the Commission to “recycle” regio-
nal aid considerations in the context of article 87(3)(c)’s
“certain economic activities.”
Indeed, the Charleroi decision and the Draft Guidelines seem
to pay no more than lip service to regional development
considerations. None of the criteria they set out for the
compatibility of start-up aid with the Treaty is clearly linked
to any regional development aim, with the single exception
that start-up aid may be granted for up to five years, rather
than three, in the case of article 87(3)(a) regions.
The Draft Guidelines’ definition of airports at which start-
up aid would be available makes no reference to the location
of the airport in question, but only to the number of
passengers using that airport. But passenger numbers are
clearly an inadequate proxy for airport location because they
do not allow for a distinction between airports that are truly
regional, and “secondary” airports. The latter are merely
smaller airports located in well-developed and populated areas
– for example, Venice-Treviso or Paris-Beauvais.
Moreover, the only airports for which the Commission
clearly excludes start-up aid are those with more than 10
million passengers per year. This still leaves airports such as
Brussels eligible for assistance as “regional airports” – a clear
indication that “start-up aid” as proposed in the Draft Guide-
lines has little to do with regional aid considerations.
Start-up aid as relieving congestion in the air and on the
ground?
Equally questionable is the notion that start-up aid for activi-
ties at smaller airports, regional or secondary, could reduce
congestion in the air and on the ground.
First, as with the regional aid justification, there is no clear
link between perceived congestion and the eligibility for start-
up aid. Brussels Zaventem is not a congested airport, yet this
was not a factor in the Commission’s willingness to authorise
start-up aid for Ryanair at Charleroi airport, referred to by
Ryanair as “Brussels South.”
Second, to the extent that congestion is a real problem, the
question is whether start-up aid will do anything to remedy it.
The essence of “start-up” aid is that it incentivises an airline to
start up a wholly new route, rather than simply moving its
traffic from a congested hub airport. Indeed, at paragraph
92(d), the Draft Guidelines explicitly state that start-up aid
should not be available for a route replacing another route that
the airline had previously served from another airport “located
in the same economic attraction zone or population centre.”
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Third, it is questionable whether start-up aid could ever
achieve the aim of relieving congestion at major hub airports –
if this were really what such aid was designed to achieve. Hub
airports are congested because carriers are drawn to them for
the very connectivity benefits that cause those airports to be
congested. Secondary or regional airports – to the extent that
they do not form spokes connected to a hub – are attractive
only to carriers unconcerned about connectivity because they
seek to attract only local traffic. In any event, those carriers will
typically seek out regional or secondary airports, rather than
congested hubs, due to their much lower costs, for example
because of lower landing and airport charges. Conversely, it
would take enormous financial incentives for a network carrier
to open up routes unconnected to its hub, because its very
business model is premised on attracting a high number of
connecting passengers.
Fourth, as regards congestion on the ground, it is difficult to
see what benefits would result from authorising start-up aid.
To the extent that airlines operating from regional or secon-
dary airports actually reduce surface traffic, this will most likely
be at the expense of train travel. However, it is precisely such
a diversion of traffic away from rail transport that is anathema
to the Draft Guidelines, which consider that no start-up aid
should be granted if there is already a competitive high-speed
rail link (para 87).
Environmental benefits?
The Charleroi decision also mentions the environmental
benefit – avoidance of pollution – of encouraging use of re-
gional airports through start-up aid. The Draft Guidelines do
well not to take up this line of argument.
There is no case that start-up aid reduces pollution. To the
extent that low-cost airlines, which are the primary if not
exclusive beneficiaries of start-up aid, create opportunities for
discretionary (often weekend) travel, this will increase rather
than reduce pollution. The same applies to the extent that
carriers use secondary airports such as Charleroi to attract
urban populations who would otherwise have used the main
airport. As most secondary airports are at a greater distance
from the city centre, those passengers need additional surface
transport, usually by car or bus, so creating additional
pollution.
Development of competition between airlines?
The final justification for start-up aid mentioned in the
Charleroi decision – again one that is absent from the Draft
Guidelines – is the notion that such aid could facilitate the
“development of competition” between airlines. This is plainly
not a ground on which any kind of state aid should be auth-
orised under recognised principles of state aid law.
Authorising aid in order to encourage competition would
be tantamount to authorising aid because of, rather than
despite, its distortive effects on competition. This is excluded
by article 87(3)(c) of the EC Treaty, which allows the
Commission to authorise aid only “where such aid does not
adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the
common interest.”
Indeed, in the Draft Guidelines the Commission attempts to
create certain safeguards to ensure that the recipient of “start-
up aid” does not enter into competition with carriers already
operating from the same airport or from another one in the
same population centre or economic attraction zone.
Conclusion on possible justifications for “start-up aid”
It follows from the preceding discussion that the justifications
offered for start-up aid in its currently proposed form lack a
sound policy rationale linked to the development of regional
airports, are inconsistent with the criteria developed for
permissible start-up aid, are to an extent self-contradictory,
and are arguably even incompatible with the state aid rules of
the Treaty.
Conditions for start-up aid
While allowing operating aid for low-cost carriers at regional
airports is thus conceptually problematic, the parameters for
permissible operating aid in the Charleroi decision and the
Draft Guidelines appear to aggravate rather than minimise the
resulting distortions of competition in at least three respects:
• permitting an unprecedented duration and intensity of
operating aid
• stipulating that aid should be calculated on a per-passenger
basis
• providing no apparent limits on the use of aid to subsidise
promotional tariffs.
Duration and intensity of start-up aid
As noted above, under the EC Treaty it is the rare exception that
operating aid is allowed at all. In the case of start-up aid, the
maximum permissible duration of five years and intensity of 50%
of eligible start-up costs are unprecedented for aid measures.
In justifying a five-year period in the Charleroi decision, the
Commission relied on a “similarity to public service
obligation schemes” (para 312). However, such an analogy is
weak. Low-cost carriers such as Ryanair are heavily geared
towards discretionary travel rather than travel meeting basic
business and social needs in remote or sparsely populated
regions. Moreover, Regulation 2408/92 allows only for a
three-year duration of compensation for public service obli-
gations, and requires member states to use an open and non-
discriminatory tendering process that normally averts a find-
ing of state aid in the first place.
Similarly, a 50% ceiling for permissible aid intensity is extra-
ordinary, as the Commission readily acknowledges in the
Charleroi decision (para 319), even apart from the particularly
detrimental category of operating aid. By way of example,
under the guidelines on national regional aid, the highest aid
intensity permissible under article 87(3)(c) of the EC Treaty is
generally 20%, except in the sparsely populated or outermost
regions, where it may be as high as 30%.
In addition, the Charleroi decision and the Draft Guidelines
appear to say that only the average aid intensity over five years
has to be limited to 50% of the total additional start-up cost,
so that even higher percentages would be permitted during
the initial part of the relevant period.
Per-passenger calculation
Another potential source of competitive distortion is the
requirement that the total aid be calculated “per embarking
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passenger” (para 92(j) of the Draft Guidelines). This means that
the carrier in question will receive more aid the more
successful it is on the route in question. For example, the
higher its load factors are and the more the carrier increases its
frequencies, the more start-up aid it could expect.
Such a method of calculation is at odds with the stated
purpose of start-up aid, i.e. to compensate for the risks of
flying from an unknown regional airport. If start-up aid were
about insuring low-cost carriers against the risk of commercial
failure due to the relative obscurity of the airport in question,
it should in fact provide for the opposite: the fewer passengers,
the more aid.
No apparent limits on subsidising promotional tariffs
While the Charleroi decision notes with apparent disapproval
the “in principle unlimited” use of public funds to subsidise
Ryanair’s promotional fares (which can be as low as £1.00 –
€1.46), neither the decision nor the Draft Guidelines contain
any clear prohibition on using aid for this purpose. Indeed,
given the pervasiveness of promotional fares as an advertising
tool for low-cost carriers, they will be quick to claim that the
“costs” of such fares are “marketing and advertising costs
incurred at the outset for publicising the link” (para 92(b) of the
Draft Guidelines).
Directly subsidising the selling price is surely the most dis-
tortive form of aid imaginable, so that the Draft Guidelines’
admonition that aid not be used to cover recurring operating
costs such as aircraft leases may be of little practical relevance.
Conclusion
Both the concept of start-up aid and its implementation as
proposed in the Draft Guidelines are flawed. Despite the Draft
Guidelines’ attempt to portray start-up aid as part of a rational
and consistent policy to promote the use of regional airports,
it is readily apparent that start-up aid is designed to support a
particular business model – that of low-cost carriers such as
Ryanair.
Such a move may be politically expedient given the current
popularity of the low cost business model and the low-cost
carriers’ skills in using regulatory proceedings to further raise
their public profile. But it is bad state aid policy.
At the very least, the Commission should revise the Draft
Guidelines to limit start-up aid to cases in which airlines
depart from truly regional airports located away from the
major population centres and “economic attraction zones”
already served by other carriers, including those served
indirectly through the spokes of network carriers.
Furthermore, the Commission should change the Draft
Guidlelines’ methodology to ensure that carriers departing
from such regional airports are only insured against the risks of
flying from such airports, but do not receive additional
financial rewards if they make the route a success by attracting
a large number of passengers. 
Only then can start-up aid begin to serve the Commission’s
stated aim: to be part of a coherent state aid framework.
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